Attorney Liability to Estate Beneficiaries: The Privity Passes Through by Fuller, Todd A.
Volume 100 
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 100, 
1995-1996 
10-1-1995 
Attorney Liability to Estate Beneficiaries: The Privity Passes 
Through 
Todd A. Fuller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Todd A. Fuller, Attorney Liability to Estate Beneficiaries: The Privity Passes Through, 100 DICK. L. REV. 29 
(1995). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol100/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Attorney Liability to Estate




Traditional notions of liability do not easily apply to the
relationship between an estate attorney and beneficiaries of the
estate. No direct attorney-client relationship exists; the attorney is
hired by the estate's personal representative - not by the benefi-
ciaries.' The beneficiaries, thus, are considered third parties to the
agreement between the attorney and the personal representative.
This does not mean, however, that liability does not, or should not,
exist when the attorney's acts or omissions cause harm to the
beneficiaries.
Traditional arguments provide that attorneys owe no duty to
anyone other than their clients, with whom they are in privity.2
Even today, the extent of an attorney's liability to third parties is
difficult to determine because of the broad range of possibilities in
which an attorney's actions might affect someone who is not her
client.3 It is virtually impossible to create a general rule to encom-
pass every situation involving an attorney and the various persons
that attorney's actions may affect throughout the course of
* Associate with Mette, Evans & Woodside in Harrisburg, PA. B.A., University of
Pittsburgh, 1992; J.D., University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1995.
1. This individual is generally referred to as a personal representative or executor when
appointed by the testator, or an administrator when appointed in the event of intestacy. See
infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. For purposes of this Article, the distinction
between the two is superfluous as the fiduciary duties owed by this individual to the estate
beneficiaries are identical. Hereinafter the estate fiduciary, therefore, will be referred to as
the "personal representative."
2. See National Say. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 64-74.
3. Examples include: successful representation of an accused criminal who later
commits a crime; divorce litigation that negatively impacts the economic well-being of the
children involved; drafting wills for a testator who wishes to disinherit his children.
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representation.4 Rather, because of the unique nature of represen-
tation, each situation must be evaluated separately and on its own
merits.
However, recent decisions in both contract and tort have
expanded the concept of attorney liability to third parties beyond
conventional boundaries. Terms such as "third party" and
"foreseeable" beneficiaries, never before found in legal malpractice
cases, now appear throughout these decisions and commentaries,
5
as courts have begun to acknowledge that denial of recovery forces
innocent parties to bear the unfortunate consequences of an
attorney's conduct.6
To fully understand the potential for injustice experienced by
third party estate beneficiaries, we must first examine an attorney's
duty vis-a-vis the personal representative and the nature of estate
administration. The testator, or the state in the case of intestacy,
chooses the personal representative to administer the estate of a
decedent.7 This personal representative is a facilitator whose
purpose is to marshal the decedent's assets and to distribute them
in accordance with the desires of the decedent or the applicable
state intestacy law. It is the personal representative's responsibility
and duty to administer the estate effectively and quickly for the
benefit of the beneficiaries.8
In order to fulfill this role, personal representatives generally
hire attorneys to assist them in performing their duties. The
attorney-client and the personal representative-beneficiary
relationships, thus, are integral to estate administration. The
attorney owes a duty to the personal representative,9 who in turn
owes a duty to the beneficiaries." In either instance, when the
duty owed is breached, the respective breaching party will be held
liable to those she has injured.
Several theories exist regarding whether an attorney may be
held liable to third party beneficiaries as an injured class. Many
courts view the personal representative-beneficiary relationship as
4. But see infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text discussing the "foreseeability"
approach to the problem.
5. See generally infra text accompanying notes 75-80.
6. See generally Ellen S. Eisenberg, Note, Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 126 (1982). See also infra text accompanying notes 108-18.
7. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 23, 24 and accompanying text.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 45-56.
10. See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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potentially adversarial, and as a result refuse to recognize a duty
owed by the attorney to the beneficiaries. Recognizing an
attorney-beneficiary relationship would impose another duty upon
an attorney, which might potentially conflict with the original duty
owed to her client, the alleged adversary to the beneficiary." Still
other courts choose to acknowledge a duty owed to beneficiaries
whether this duty is owed directly or indirectly, and corresponding-
ly hold attorneys responsible to third party beneficiaries. Thus,
given the complexities of the problem, no general theory currently
exists that may be universally applied in analyzing the personal
representative-beneficiary-attorney relationship.
However, one approach appears to meet this universal goal.
This approach recognizes a duty running from the attorney, through
the hiring personal representative, to the estate beneficiaries.
Under this approach, no restriction is placed on the level of duty
owed by the attorney to the beneficiaries. The attorney owes the
same duty as that owed to the personal representative. While this
duty may be seen as derivative, a more accurate assessment reveals
that the duty owed by the attorney passes through the hiring
personal representative to the beneficiaries.
This "pass through privity" approach offers several benefits. 2
First, this approach recognizes the nature of estate administration
and the nature of fiduciary responsibilities. Pass through privity
focuses on the ultimate goals of administering the estate, and not
on the parties involved in its administration. Second, pass through
privity allocates the risks associated with estate administration on
the attorney, not the estate beneficiaries. This notion satisfies the
societal need to protect the beneficiaries as innocent parties. Third,
pass through privity is very selective in imposing liability, and as a
result, this approach poses no danger of opening the floodgates to
frivolous litigation because the attorney's duty applies only to those
who share a fiduciary relationship with the party hiring the
attorney.
Despite the stated advantages of a pass through privity
approach in recognizing an attorney-beneficiary relationship, this
11. See generally RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, 1 LEGAL MALPRACTICE
§§ 7.1-7.13 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter MALLEN]. See also Rutkowski v. Hollis, 600 N.E.2d
1284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d 1080 (Wash. 1994); Hopkins v. Akins, 637
A.2d 424 (D.C. App. 1993); Goldberg v. Frye, 266 Cal. Rptr. 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
12. "Pass through privity" is a term used in this Article to describe a particular
approach. The term has not been used by any other commentator or court.
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Article examines all of the relationships and relevant issues
involved in estate administration. Part II provides a brief overview
of estate administration. Part III discusses the personal representa-
tive-beneficiary relationship. Part IV examines the attorney-client
relationship and the ethical duties imposed upon the attorney. Part
V discusses the basis of the legal malpractice action. Finally, Part
VI addresses the various theories underlying attorney liability to
third parties, and concludes that a pass through privity approach is
the appropriate method for recognizing a duty owed by the estate
attorney to the estate beneficiaries.
II. Estate Administration and the Nature of the Estate
Analysis of estate administration requires an understanding of
estate planning. An individual's right to pass property by devise is
a privilege granted by law. 3 Essentially, every individual has a
right to dispose of property as he sees fit, and to determine how
and to whom this property shall go. 4 This right is recognized as
fundamental to both public policy and the legal order of our
society. 5 At least one court has even stated that no right of a
citizen is more valued. 6
As such, the law gives great deference to a testator's desires.
With the exception of his wife, a testator may completely disinherit
anyone, including his children and closest relatives. Furthermore,
the testator may disinherit these individuals for any reason or no
reason at all.' 7 However, in the event a testator dies without
having made a will, the state in which the testator is domiciled will
13. The right to devise property, as well as the method of conveying and manner of
creating estates, are purely statutory and may be changed by the legislature in its discretion.
See, e.g., Estate of Burnison, 204 P.2d 330 (Cal. 1949), affd, U.S. v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87
(1950); Classen v. Heath, 58 N.E.2d 889 (Ill. 1949); Knowle's Estate, 145 A. 797 (Pa. 1929).
14. See San Diego Trust & Say. Bank v. Heustis, 10 P.2d 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932); In
re Estate of Haines, 366 N.E.2d 548 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Paul Will, 180 A.2d 254 (Pa. 1962).
Note, however, that a transfer may not be illegal or contrary to public policy. See Lydick
v. Tate, 44 N.E.2d 583 (I1. 1942); Mohler's Estate, 22 A.2d 680 (Pa. 1941) (establishing
criteria as to when a bequest contravenes the recognized interests of society).
15. See Jacobs v. Gerecht, 86 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Cal. App. Ct. 1970); see also Arbulich v.
Arbulich, 257 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1953); In re Nole's Will, 46 N.Y.S.2d 429 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944).
16. In re Gayman's Estate, 21 Northumb. Legal J. 149 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1949).
17. However harsh and unnatural a testamentary devise may seem when it disinherits
a child, it is within the legal power of a competent testator to will his property as he sees fit.
See Hart v. Gudger, 314 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1957); Budlong v. Los Angeles Bible Inst., 16 N.E.2d
810 (Il. App. Ct. 1938); In re Little's Estate, 170 A.2d 106 (Pa. 1961).
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provide a plan for distribution."8 State statutes, whether derived
from common law or civil law, invariably parcel the property in
accordance with the natural law of consanguinity.19  In either
case, a testator's property is intended to be distributed fairly and
efficiently.
To distribute this property, an estate requires an individual to
be in charge of its affairs. Thus, prior to death, a testator may
designate a personal representative.2' This representative is to
ensure that the testator's property passes to his heirs in accordance
with his wishes.21 If the testator fails to execute a will or name a
personal representative, the state will appoint an administrator.22
This administrator performs relatively the same functions as a
personal representative in administering the assets of the estate.
The sole purpose of estate administration, and the sole duty of
a personal representative, is to carry out the intent of the decedent
or the purpose of the state intestacy laws. 23  Primarily, this duty
requires the personal representative to administer the estate
speedily, orderly, and to the best advantage of all concerned.24
18. See, e.g., U.P.C. §§ 2-102, to 2-114 (1983); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6401, 6402, 6402.5
(West 1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 755 para. 5/2-1 (1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2105.06-
2105.063, 2105.10-2105.14 (Baldwin 1994); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2101-14 (Supp. 1995).
19. The principle that an individual's intestate property shall go to his own next of kin
has at all times been recognized and preserved by state statute. See, e.g., U.P.C. §§ 2-102,
2-103 (and the official comments thereto); see also Dunlap v. Lynn, 89 N.W.2d 58 (Neb.
1958); In re Long's Estate, 67 P.2d 41 (Okla. 1936).
20. Persons appointed by will are usually referred to as "executors" or "personal
representatives." See, e.g., In re Estate of Spaits, 453 N.E.2d 39 (Il. App. Ct. 1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 472 N.E.2d 784 (11. 1984).
21. Appointment is presumably granted to the executor named in the will by the
testator. See, e.g., Matter of Faught's Estate, 445 N.E.2d 54 (Il. App. Ct. 1983); In re Nagle's
Estate 317 N.E.2d 242 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974). Note, however, that this right is subject to
approval by the court. See U.P.C. § 3-103; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3155 (Supp. 1995); see also
Lindley v. U.S., 59 F.2d 336 (9th Cir 1932); In re Fiddyment's Estate, 168 P.2d 61 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1946); Hermann v. Crossen, 160 N.E.2d 404 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959); In re Chesney's
Estate, 22 Northumb. Legal J. 103 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1950). For the proposition that the law
will disqualify certain individuals from serving as personal representative, see In re Kelly's
Will, 235 N.Y.S. 683 (N.Y. Surrogate's Ct. 1929); In re Craig Estate, 32 Som. L. J. 255 (Pa.
Orphans' Ct. 1976).
22. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 8460 (West 1991); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3155
(Supp. 1995). An individual appointed in the event of intestacy is usually referred to as an
"administrator." In re Publicker's Estate, 123 A.2d 655 (Pa. 1956).
23. See U.P.C. § 3-703; see also Graybar Elec. Co. v. McClave, 371 P.2d 350 (Ariz.
1962); Hecker v. Schuler, 231 N.E.2d 877 (Ohio 1967).
24. See, e.g., In re Cunningham's Estate, 305 P.2d 920 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); In re Van
Valkenburgh's Will, 298 N.Y.S. 819 (N.Y. Surrogate's Ct. 1937); In re Wright's Estate, 133
N.E.2d 350 (Ohio 1956); In re Wallis' Estate, 218 A.2d 732 (Pa. 1966).
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Personal representatives are instrumentalities appointed for the
purpose of ensuring that the decedent's debts are paid and the
remainder of the decedent's estate is distributed to the beneficia-
ries.
Understanding the role of the personal representative in estate
administration clarifies the nature of the estate. A decedent's
estate is a compilation of assets and liabilities owned by the
decedent prior to distribution by will or intestacy.' It is a
conduit, recognized by both property law26 and tax law,27 as an
effective means of passing the property of the decedent to
beneficiaries and creditors.2 However, the success of this conduit
depends upon the assistance of personal representatives.
III. Nature of the Personal Representative-Beneficiary Relation-
ship
Given the nature and weight of his duties, the personal
representative is generally cloaked with a significant amount of
power.29 For example, most statutes provide that "title" to a
decedent's property passes to the beneficiaries but is subject to
possession by the personal representative for the purpose of
25. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 379 (6th ed. 1991); see also Hansen v. Stanton, 31 P.2d
903 (Wash. 1934).
26. See In re Brunet's Estate, 207 P.2d 567, 569 (Cal. App. Ct. 1949); see also In re
Glass, 130 P. 868 (Cal. 1913); Gardner v. Anderson, 227 P. 743 (Kan. 1924). Note that these
cases deal with testamentary gifts to either the testator's or another's estate. There is
contrary authority regarding this issue. However, those cases hold that the gift was actually
through the estate to the intended beneficiaries rather than to the estate itself. There is little
authority holding that an estate is an entity. See B.C. Ricketts, Annotation, Validity,
Construction, and Effect at Bequest or Devise to a Person's Estate, or to the Person or His
Estate, 10 A.L.R.3d 483 (1966).
27. Decedent and his estate are separate tax entities for income tax purposes. See 26
U.S.C. 641 (1988); see also Biewer v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1965); Davidson
v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 208 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
28. For purposes of determining who should bear the burden of estate income tax,
Congress has adopted the conduit principle under which an estate is treated as a taxable
entity and is taxed, in general, on income realized but not distributed to the beneficiaries.
When income is distributed to the beneficiaries, it is not taxable to the estate, but instead is
taxable to the beneficiaries. See Mott v. United States, 462 F.2d 512 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973).
29. In the performance of his duties, a personal representative shall use the authority
conferred upon him by law, the terms of the will, if any, and any order to which he is a party
for the best interests of successors to the estate. See U.P.C. § 3-703; see also Hart's Estate,
48 Pa. D. & C. 101 (Erie. Co. 1943) (power granted by decedent); South Side Trust & Say.
Bank v. South Side Trust & Sav. Bank, 284 N.E.2d 61 (111. App. Ct. 1972); In re Faelchle's
Estate, 89 N.E.2d 96 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1942) (power granted by state).
[Vol. 100:1
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administration.3" Additional powers entrusted to the personal
representative may include the power to compromise any demand
of the decedent,3 continue the decedent's business,32 sell the
decedent's property,33 lease and collect rents on the decedent's
property,34 and invest estate assets.35  These powers enable the
representative to more easily meet the objectives set forth by the
testator or the intestacy laws.
30. At common law, only personal property was subject to the control of the executor.
The Land Transfer Act of 1897, however, provides that land as well as chattels vest in the
decedent's personal representative. Land Transfer Act of 1897, 60 & 61 Vict. ch. 65 § 1; 3
AMERICAN LAW OF PROP. § 14.6 (1952). Most modem statutes provide that title to a
decedent's property, both real and personal, passes to the devisees or heirs subject to the
possession of the executor. See, e.g., U.P.C. §§ 3-709, 3-711; Cal. Prob. Code § 300 (West
1991); see also In re Elwell's Estate, 274 N.E.2d 902 (I11. App. Ct. 1971). However, if the
property is in the possession of a beneficiary and is not needed for purposes of administra-
tion, the personal representative has no right or duty to take possession of it. In re Brill's
Will, 144 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Surrogate's Ct. 1955); Fitch v. Oesch, 281 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio Prob.
Ct. 1971); Pierce Estate, 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 51 (1950), affd, 160 A.2d 205 (Pa. 1960).
31. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3323 (1975); see also Green v. Benson, 271 F. Supp.
90 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Love v. Wolf, 58 Cal. Rptr. 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); In re Bertrand's
Estate, 82 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. Surrogate's Ct. 1948); Yoffe Estate, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 281 (Pa.
Orphans' Ct. 1956). Note, however, that the personal representative is limited by the letters
of administration and must act honestly and reasonably. See, e.g., Edelstien v. Old Colony
Trust Co., 147 N.E.2d 193 (Mass. 1958); Gateway Trading Co. v. Children's Hosp. of
Pittsburgh, 265 A.2d 115 (Pa. 1970).
32. While a personal representative may not ordinarily engage in business with estate
funds, exceptions will be made when continued operation is necessary for protection of the
estate or is authorized by will, statute, or court order. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 3-715 (24); see also
In re Szantay's Estate, 235 N.E.2d 861 (I11. App. Ct. 1968); Bowen v. Lewis, 426 P.2d 244
(Kan. 1967); In re Sulzer's Estate, 185 A. 793 (Pa. 1936); New York Merchandise Co. v.
Stout, 264 P.2d 863 (Wash. 1954).
33. A power of sale may be granted by court order, statute, or will. When there is a
will, a personal representative may sell the testator's real property for any lawful purpose
to which the testator wishes the proceeds to be applied. This power may be either express
or implied. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Benz, 138 N.E.2d 496 (I11. 1956); In re Schaffer's Estate,
61 A.2d 872 (Pa. 1948). In contrast, absent a statute to the contrary, a personal representa-
tive has an absolute power to sell the personal property of a decedent's estate as he sees fit.
In re Estate of Germond, 483 P.2d 769 (Cal. 1971); In re Furst's Estate, 168 N.Y.S.2d 104
(Surrogate's Ct. 1957).
34. As with a power of sale, authority to lease a decedent's real property may be
granted by court order, statute, or will. See, e.g., In re Well's Will, 26 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1941);
Quality Lumber & Millwork Co. v. Andrus, 200 A.2d 754 (Pa. 1964). A power to lease also
may arise, however, by reason of terms of a prior lease existing at the time of the decedent's
death. O'Connor v. Chiascione, 33 A.2d 336 (Conn. 1943); Wisotzkey Estate, 1 Adams Co.
Legal J. 43 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1959); In re Mundt Estates, 14 P.2d 59 (Wash. 1932).
35. While the responsibilities of a personal representative or administrator are generally
limited to the collection and distribution of estate assets, a duty to invest may be imposed
upon him either by will or by statute. See In re Flynn's Will, 73 N.Y.S.2d 408 (Surrogate's
Ct. 1947); McFadden Estate, 34 Del. Co. Rep. 503 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1946).
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As mentioned, the personal representative is appointed for the
purpose of handling the assets and conducting the business of the
estate in accordance with the intent of the testator. He is held to
the highest degree of good faith in performing these duties,36 and
owes a "fiduciary" responsibility to the estate beneficiaries. Thus,
the standards to which the personal representative is held in
performing this duty are among the highest imposed by law.37 For
instance, self-dealing and intermingling of estate funds with those
of the personal representative are either strictly prohibited or
severely restricted.38 If any such conflicts arise, courts are often
compelled to remove an offending personal representative.39 Most
states, recognizing the power of the personal representative and the
dangers of abuse, require personal representatives to account for
their actions in court.40 Hence, to avoid such scrutiny, a represen-
tative must maintain the utmost level of care and loyalty until the
closing of the estate or the discharge of his duty.
Once a personal representative is appointed, his authority
continues until the estate has been completely administered, or
until the personal representative dies, resigns, or is removed.41
36. See Blair v. Mahon, 230 P.2d 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951); Redmer v. Hakala, 99 N.E.2d
831 (Ill. App. Ct. 1951); In re Chambers' Estate, 36 N.E.2d 175 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941), appeal
dismissed, 24 N.E.2d 601 (Ohio 1939); In re Craig's Estate, 109 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1954); In re
Peterson's Estate, 123 P.2d 733 (Wash. 1942).
37. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY supra note 25, at 625.
38. In general, fiduciaries may not buy from or sell to themselves. See V.P.C. § 3-713
(1983). Likewise, commingling of estate funds with those of the personal representative is
prohibited. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 179 (1959); Matter of Glavin, 625
N.Y.S.2d 311 (N.Y. 1995). In some instances, such actions may warrant removal, even when
the personal representative restores the funds. See U.P.C. § 3-713; Matter of Chapman's
Estate, 433 N.E.2d 313 (III. Ct. App. 1982); Matter of Garwood's Estate, 400 N.E.2d 758
(Ind. 1980).
39. A personal representative should be removed whenever a conflict of interest arises
that interferes with the objective administration of the estate. See In re Estate of Devoy, 596
N.E.2d 1339 (11. App. Ct. 1992); In re Staufer's Estate, 57 N.E.2d 145 (Ohio Ct. App. 1944).
Any sale to the personal representative of estate property is a conflict of interest. See U.P.C.
§ 3-713.
40. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 399 (West Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 206, § 1
(1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2109.30 (Baldwin 1995). Note, however, that in states that
allow "independent administration," fiduciaries are free from court supervision. See U.P.C.
§ 3-1003(a) (If administration is not supervised, a personal representative may close an estate
by simply filing a statement that he has given an account to the beneficiaries.).
41. See Estate of MacLeish, 342 N.E.2d 740 (I1. App. Ct. 1976) (an executor must fulfill
his responsibilities until he is discharged from office); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 196, cmt. f (1959). But see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 760, para. 5/12 (1992) (trustee can
resign by giving notice); CAL. PROB. CODE § 15640 (West 1991) (consent of adult
beneficiaries sufficient).
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Estate administration is generally considered "complete" once the
decedent's debts have been paid and all distributions have been
made among the beneficiaries.42  Many jurisdictions require a
final accounting and court approval followed by a formal discharge
before the personal representative will be relieved of his duties.43
Only when the personal representative is discharged will his powers
and liabilities with respect to the estate and the beneficiaries
cease.
44
IV. Nature of the Attorney-Client Relationship
Attorneys, as officers of the court, must conform to the highest
of ethical standards, both in their professional and personal lives.
45
Their conduct must secure and preserve the respect and confidence
of the public in both the legal profession and the judicial system as
a whole.4 Attorneys are bound by integrity, honesty, and profes-
sional decorum to conduct themselves with candor, competence,
and fairness.
47
In conforming with these standards, an attorney is obliged to
act "with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client
and with zeal in advocacy on the client's behalf., 48 An attorney's
responsibilities are those of a "fiduciary," involving the highest
42. A personal representative's power and duty to administer the estate will continue
as long as the personal representative controls assets subject to valid claims. See Johnston
v. Schwenck, 124 N.E. 61 (Ohio 1918); see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 12251 (West 1991);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.03 (Baldwin 1995); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3184 (1975).
43. See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3533 (1975); In re Thompson's Estate, 97
S.W.2d 93 (Mo. 1936); Wiseman's Estate, 12 Phila. Reports 11 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1877).
44. Executors who have been duly discharged are relieved of all powers and liabilities
related to administering the estate. See Johnston v. Long, 181 P.2d 645 (Cal. 1947); In re
Courtin, 81 So. 457 (La. 1919); Sheet's Estate, 25 Pa. D. 383 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1916).
45. Admission to the bar requires good moral character as well as proficiency in the law.
See, e.g., Ross v. Reda, 510 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975); In re Clark,
134 N.E.2d 281 (I11. 1956); Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Auwaerter, 430 N.E.2d 947 (Ohio 1982); In
re Carson, 378 P.2d 450 (Wash. 1963).
46. Persons dealing with an attorney have a right to rely upon the professional
endorsement of the attorney's honesty and integrity by the bar and the courts. See, e.g.,
Resnik v. State Bar, 460 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1969); In re Lingle, 189 N.E.2d 342 (I11. 963).
47. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.3, 1.1, 3.4; MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(A), 7-101(A), 6-101, EC 101; see also Schlosser
v. Jursich, 410 N.E.2d 257 (Il1. App. Ct. 1980).
48. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 1; see also People
v. Johnson, 95 Cal. Rptr. 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Ruggiero v. Attore, 366 N.E.2d 470 (I11.
App. Ct. 1977); Hawkins v. King County, 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
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degrees of trust and confidence.49 Once an attorney agrees to
represent an individual, she must maintain strict confidentiality of
information relating to that representation. This responsibility
is intended to encourage the client to communicate freely and
completely with his attorney. As a result, the client's trust and the
attorney's loyalty form the basis for a productive working relation-
ship.51 Thus, when the client's trust is breached by the attorney's
negligence or misconduct, the attorney is accountable and may be
held liable for malpractice.52
The attorney's duty of loyalty to her client represents the
greatest barrier to recognizing multiple duties on the part of an
attorney during estate administration. Since the attorney is hired
by the personal representative, courts have been reluctant to
impose a duty upon attorneys to protect estate beneficiaries
because of the perceived conflict that may arise between the
interests of the personal representative and estate beneficiaries.
Rules prohibiting such potential conflicts provide that an
attorney representing one client cannot fairly represent or advise
an adverse party.53 The rationale is self evident: representation
of potentially adverse interests impairs the attorney's professional
judgment.54 However, an attorney may represent two clients
whose interests do not conflict in any significant degree provided,
of course, that the attorney provides full disclosure to the parties
and that the parties consent to representation by the attorney.5
49. See Christison v. Jones, 405 N.E.2d 8 (I11. App. Ct. 1980); Matter of Stein, 483 A.2d
109 (N.J. 1984); Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992).
Attorneys hold the status of fiduciaries vis-a-vis their clients. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 17
F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1927); Sodikoff v. State Bar, 535 P.2d 331 (Cal. 1975); Greene v. First Nat'l
Bank, 516 N.E.2d 311 (I11. App. Ct. 1987); Hood v. Kline, 212 P.2d 110 (Wash. 1949).
50. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6.
51. See Adams v. Fleck, 154 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1959), affd, 172 N.E.2d 126
(Ohio 1961) (lawyers are in positions of trust when undertaking any task for a client).
52. An attorney's duty to act in good faith and with the highest degree of fidelity holds
the attorney responsible for damages resulting from a breach of that duty. See, e.g., Norton
v. Hines, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101,
(I11. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 156 (1991).
53. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1995).
54. An attorney cannot serve two masters. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 309 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1957); People v. Coslet, 364 N.E.2d 67 (I1. 1977); Seifert v. Dumatic Indus. Inc., 197 A.2d
454 (Pa. 1964); Pacific Coast Cement Co. v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 23 P.2d 890
(Wash. 1933).
55. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1995). Attorneys who
represent parties with divergent interests owe the highest duty to disclose all facts which are
necessary to enable the parties to make a fully informed consent to the representation. See,
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The test applied to determine whether an attorney should be
prevented from representing conflicting interests is not actuality of
conflict but the possibility that a conflict might arise.56 Thus, it is
under these standards that an attorney's action must be evaluated
vis-a-vis the estate beneficiaries and personal representative.
V. The Legal Malpractice Claim
A. Essential Elements
Legal malpractice claims may be based on a number of
theories.57 Usually, however, an attorney is sued under contract
or tort theories.58 Regardless of the basis for the claim, the
essential elements are the same, and include: (1) the attorney
undertook to provide legal services on the plaintiff's behalf, or
some other basis for duty; (2) the attorney failed to exercise
ordinary skill, knowledge, and judgment in rendering these legal
services; (3) the plaintiff suffered actual injury; and (4) the
attorney's failure to exercise the requisite skill and knowledge
demanded by the law proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries."
While this Article focuses upon the first element, establishment
of duty, the importance of the other elements should not be
ignored. For instance, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving that
the attorney failed to exercise ordinary skill, knowledge, and
e.g., Klemm v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Peppers, 355 N.E.2d 24 (II1. 1976); Slater v. Rimar, Inc., 338 A.2d 584 (Pa. 1975);
Matter of Lauderdale's Guardianship, 549 P.2d 42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976). To have full
disclosure, an attorney must explain to her clients that she is going to represent both of them.
An attorney also must explain the nature and extent of the conflict of interest in sufficient
detail that both clients can understand why it may be desirable for each to have independent
counsel. See, e.g., Lysick v. Walcom, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); Jedwabny v.
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 135 A.2d 252 (Pa. 1957).
56. See, e.g., In re Becker, 158 N.E.2d 753 (Ill. 1959); Pirillo v. Takiff, 341 A.2d 896,
reinstated, 352 A.2d 11 (Pa. 1975).
57. See generally MALLEN supra note 11.
58. See Garcia v. Community Legal Serv. Corp., 524 A.2d 980 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
But see Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 244 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (emphasizing the
contractual nature of the attorney-client relationship and denying the cause of action for
negligence).
59. See Garris v. Severson, Merson, Berke & Melchior, 252 Cal. Rptr. 204 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988); Sexton v. Smith, 492 N.E.2d 1284 (111 1986); David v. Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf &
Rock Co., L.P.A., 607 N.E.2d 1173 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108
(Pa. 1993).
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judgment in rendering legal services.' An attorney will not be
held liable for malpractice as long as she employs such judgment as
is expected by the standards of the law and the profession. 61  To
meet this burden of proof, the plaintiff generally will have to obtain
experts in the legal profession to establish the applicable standard
of care and the attorney's subsequent breach thereof.62 Finally,
the plaintiff must show that the attorney's negligence was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's actual injury.63
Thus, establishing the requisite duty is only the initial criterion
and does not alone establish legal malpractice. To succeed in a
claim of malpractice, a plaintiff must jump through several hoops.
As mentioned above, he must set forth not only the existence of a
duty, but that this duty was breached and proximately caused the
plaintiff's injuries. Thus, while the existence of a duty does not in
and of itself win a malpractice claim, it forms the essential basis of
such a claim.
B. The Threshold of Duty
Regardless of whether a legal malpractice claim is brought
under a contract or tort theory, a plaintiff must cross the initial
60. An attorney must be held to the same standard of care as other professionals.
Schenkel v. Monheit, 405 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
61. Attorneys will be held liable to their clients for damages resulting from their failure
to exercise the degree of care and skill expected from the legal profession. See, e.g., Gray
v. Hallett, 525 N.E.2d 89 (II. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 245 (II. 1988); Schenkel
v. Monheit, 405 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super Ct. 1979). However, attorneys are not liable for poor
judgment. See, e.g., York v. Stiefel, 440 N.E.2d 440 (I1l. App. Ct. 1982), modified, 458 N.E.2d
488 (Ill. 1983). Liability will not attach for lack of knowledge of the law when a doubtful or
debatable point is involved. See, e.g., Howard v. Sweeney, 499 N.E.2d 383 (Ohio Ct. App.
1986).
62. See Hirschberger v. Silverman, 609 N.E.2d 1301 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Gans v. Gray,
612 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1985). Expert testimony is required to establish the requisite
standard of care in a legal malpractice action unless common knowledge or experience of the
layperson is extensive enough to recognize or infer negligence from the facts, or when an
attorney's negligence is so grossly apparent that a layperson would have no difficulty
appraising it. See Barth v. Reagan, 564 N.E.2d 1196 (111. 1990).
63. Before legal malpractice can occur, the plaintiff must have incurred damages that
were directly and proximately caused by the attorney's actions. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Krol,
578 N.E.2d 212 (I11. App. Ct. 1991); Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 573 N.E.2d 159
(Ohio Ct. App. 1989). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that damages resulted. See,
e.g., Duke & Co. v. Anderson, 418 A.2d 613 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980). Once a plaintiff has
introduced evidence that an attorney's negligent act or omission increased the risk of harm
to a person in the plaintiff's position, and that harm was in fact sustained, it becomes a
question for the jury as to whether that increased risk of harm was a substantial factor in
producing the harm. See, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978).
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threshold by establishing a duty owed to him by the attorney.'
This is most easily accomplished by showing that the attorney and
the injured party were in direct privity with one another through an
attorney-client relationship.65 Direct privity exists pursuant to a
contract theory where the attorney and client enter into an
agreement. Under this theory, the existence of an agreement
necessarily establishes the requisite duty needed for a potential
malpractice claim. Such a duty mandates that the attorney perform
a specific act or service,6 6 and only upon a showing that the
attorney failed to fulfill this duty will the plaintiff be able to
substantiate a breach.67
In addition to this contract theory, direct privity also arises as
a result of merely hiring an attorney with the mutual understanding
that she will undertake representation of the client with ordinary
skill and knowledge.' The hiring of an attorney invokes the
attorney's duty to act with the utmost good faith and loyalty.
Establishing the requisite duty in this manner enables the plaintiff
to begin to form a cause of action in tort. Thus, by showing the
requisite duty, the plaintiff has established the initial element of a
malpractice claim.
Historically, a demonstration of privity was necessary to
support a legal malpractice claim under either theory.69 Even
64. See Hughes v. Consol-Pa. Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1991) (to establish legal
malpractice under Pennsylvania law, plaintiff must show employment of the attorney or other
basis for duty owed to client).
65. The very existence of an attorney-client relationship raises a presumption of trust
and confidence between the parties and consequently requires a high degree of fidelity and
good faith. See, e.g., In re Hix, 161 B.R. 401 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993). The establishment
of an attorney-client relationship is the most common and easiest method of demonstrating
a duty running from the attorney to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Zanders v. Jones, 680 F. Supp.
1236 (N.D. I11. 1988), affd, 872 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1989); Fox v. Pollack, 226 Cal. Rptr. 532
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Canady v. Shwartz, 577 N.E.2d 437 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
66. See Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 166 Cal. Rptr. 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
67. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 823 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Lichow v.
Sowers, 6 A.2d 285 (Pa. 1939).
68. See, e.g., Lawall v. Groman, 37 A. 98 (Pa. 1897); Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744
(Pa. 1983). An attorney-client relationship also may be implied from the conduct of the
parties. See, e.g., Connolly v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 463 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Pa.
1978); George v. Caton, 600 P.2d 822 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979); Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller
& Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980).
69. In 1879, the United States Supreme Court applied the English Rule set forth in
Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), holding that in the absence of fraud,
collusion, or privity of contract, an individual owes no duty of care to third parties injured
by his conduct. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); see infra notes 115-17 and
accompanying text.
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today, the privity requirement remains substantially intact,
reinforced by the adversarial nature of our legal system, which
requires undivided loyalty and zealous representation of a client.7°
Therefore, any failure to cross this threshold typically results in a
failure of the malpractice claim.
C. Failure to Cross the Duty Threshold
Failure to establish privity is synonymous with failure to
establish an attorney-client relationship and usually is fatal to a
legal malpractice claim. An attorney cannot be negligent for failing
to do what there is no duty to undertake.7 Any suggestion that
an attorney owes a duty to someone other than her own client
usually is rejected. The rationale is that a rule giving rise to a duty
owed to a third party violates the notions of loyalty and zealous
representation that support and perpetuate the public's faith in the
legal system.72 Pursuant to this theory, an attorney only owes a
duty of utmost good faith and loyalty to her client, not third
parties. To allow otherwise raises concerns that (1) third party
actions deny the attorney and the client control over their own
agreement, and (2) a duty owed by an attorney to the general
public imposes potentially huge liability on attorneys in general.73
Thus, absent special circumstances, it is fairly well established that
an attorney owes no duty to third parties, and is not liable for
injuries caused by the attorney's negligence, regardless of foresee-
ability.
74
VI. Theories of Liability to Third Parties
Despite traditional concerns, many courts have relaxed the
privity requirement in legal malpractice claims. 75  The result is
70. See MALLEN, supra note 11, at 361.
71. See, e.g., Lincoln Alameda Creek v. Cooper Indus. Inc., 829 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. Cal.
1992); Emmerson v. Adult Community Total Serv. Inc., 842 F. Supp 152 (E.D. Pa.), affd,
39 F.3d 1169 (3d Cir. 1994); Held v. Arant, 134 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); McCoy
v. Engle, 537 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
72. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.3.
73. See Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060 (D.C. 1983).
74. See, e.g., Favata v. Rosenberg, 436 N.E.2d 49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Young v. Hecht,
597 P.2d 682 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979).
75. For instance, it is now a majority rule that an attorney who has negligently drafted
a will may be liable for negligence to the intended beneficiaries or heirs. See, e.g., Garcia
v. Borelli, 180 Cal. Rptr. 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060
(D.C. 1983); McLane v. Russell, 512 N.E.2d 366 (I11. App. Ct. 1987); Guy v. Liederbach, 459
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greater recognition of duties owed by an attorney to third parties
in certain situations. While it is impossible to generalize as to the
abrogation of the privity requirement, the apparent shift is due to
a recognition of the inadequacy of remedies to injured third parties
and a need to deter negligent attorney conduct.
76
In the realm of estate administration, courts have taken a
number of approaches to establish, or refuse to establish, the
requisite duty of care from attorney to a third party beneficiary.
Some rely upon a third party beneficiary approach derived from
contract law.77  Others turn to a balancing approach based
primarily upon negligence principles. 7  Still others recognize a
derivative duty running from the attorney through the personal
representative to the estate beneficiaries. Commentators have also
thrown their hats into the ring, arguing for an assumption of duty
approach,79  or an "entity" approach.' The remainder of this
Article will analyze each approach and its application to the
attorney-personal representative-beneficiary relationship.
A. Representation of the Estate Under an Entity Approach
One method utilized by the courts to establish a duty is to
recognize the estate as a separate legal entity for purposes of
representation. Under this approach, the estate, rather than any
one individual, is the client. This approach was taken by the
Michigan Court of Appeals in Steinway v. Bolden.8 In addressing
the question of an attorney's liability to estate beneficiaries, the
court held: "[A]lthough the personal representative retains the
attorney, the estate is the client rather than the personal represen-
tative." 2  The court based this holding on the fact that the
A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983). But see Deeb v. Johnson, 566 N.Y.S.2d 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(privity requirement still applies in legal malpractice actions arising out of will drafting,
whether brought by intended beneficiaries or the estate); Mali v. DeForest & Duer, 553
N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (absent special circumstances, drafter of will is not liable
to estate beneficiaries or any other party not in privity who might be harmed by drafter's
professional negligence).
76. See MALLEN, supra note 11, at 380.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 122-48.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 149-80.
79. Ellen S. Eisenberg, Note, Attorney's Negligence and Third Parties, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV.
126 (1982).
80. Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving Fiduciary Entities: Who is the Client?,
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 (1994).
81. 460 N.W.2d 306 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
82. Id. at 307.
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attorney's fees are paid by the estate and can be dispensed only
with court approval.83
The opinion of the Steinway court is shared by Judge Eunice
Ross of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas in Pennsyl-
vania." While Pennsylvania courts have not yet decided this
issue, Judge Ross asserts that the attorney for the estate stands in
a fiduciary relationship with the personal representative, the
beneficiaries, and any legitimate creditors.85 The attorney is
bound to give wise counsel to the personal representative so that
the estate may be administered in accordance with the require-
ments of the law of the Commonwealth. 86 The attorney also owes
a duty to the estate creditors to marshal assets and pay the claims
of the decedent.87 Finally, the attorney owes a duty to the estate
beneficiaries to outline the administration procedure and explain
the ultimate distribution scheme.88
This approach has also been taken up by Professor Jeffrey
Pennell.89 However, Professor Pennell takes the entity approach
one step further by viewing the estate as an "organization" within
the context of Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct.9" Professor Pennell notes that an "organization" need not
be incorporated for recognition under Rule 1.13. Rather, the term
may include any entity with a recognizable form, internal organiza-
tion and relative permanence." Under this derivative view of the
entity approach, any group seen as having an identity apart from
the individuals who comprise it is granted the status of "client" in
the relationship with an attorney.92 Because the attorney repre-
83. Id.
84. Hon. Eunice L. Ross, Who is the Client in an Estate?, Pennsylvania Bar Association
Mid-Year Meeting (1994) at M-2.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at M-3.
88. Id. at M-4.
89. Pennell, supra note 80, at 1339.
90. Model Rule 1.13 provides:
(a) A lawyer employed by an organization represents the organization
acting through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that ... [a constituent] ... is
engaged in an action ... related to ... representation that is ... [a violation
of the law] ... and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization,
thd lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization.




sents the estate as an entity, the attorney may deal with the
personal representative, the beneficiaries, and any other constitu-
ents as individuals within the entity.
93
The nature of the relationship with the collective organization
permits the attorney to consider the goals and objectives of the
estate, which may or may not be consistent with those of the
personal representative or beneficiaries. 94  Professor Pennell
compares the attorney's situation to the representation of a
corporate entity. As such, questions that arise in this context may
be answered by reference to the already well established body of
law concerning legal representation of corporate entities.95 As
with a corporation, the estate becomes the principal in the
relationship with the attorney. The personal representative is seen
as an agent of the estate who hires the attorney, thereby filling the
same role as a corporate officer, who performs a similar service on
behalf of a corporation. The attorney is paid by the estate she
serves, not by the personal representative. In addition, the attorney
may "incur responsibility to various constituents of the entity [such
as the personal representative or the beneficiaries] as derivative
clients ... [However,] the organization ... is the primary client to
whom the attorney's duties are owed.,
96
According to Professor Pennell, recognizing the estate as the
client clarifies the attorney's responsibilities to the various parties
involved. 97 Representation is guided by objective evaluation of
the best interests of the organization, rather than the various
constituents. For instance, situations may arise in which the
beneficiaries' interests become adverse to one another or to those
of the personal representative. Situations may also arise in which
the personal representative is embarking on a course that is illegal
or detrimental to the estate. Such situations normally require the
attorney to withdraw from representation. If the attorney repre-
sents the estate, however, she is free to take action to correct the
wrongs, resolve the conflicts, and benefit the constituents and the
estate as a whole.98
93. Id. at 1336.
94. Id. at 1335.
95. Id. at 1337-39.
96. Pennell, supra note 80, at 1336.
97. Id. at 1337.
98. Professor Pennell notes that withdrawal does not serve the interests of the
beneficiaries who rightly are regarded as the real parties in interest. Furthermore, it does
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Professor Pennell contends that this approach clarifies
questions involving loyalty and fidelity. Disclosure of otherwise
confidential information to other constituents is authorized to the
extent the attorney believes it reasonably necessary to further the
best interests of the estate. Professor Pennell writes, "[J]ust as
there are situations in which the attorney for a corporation is
entitled to carry information to shareholders regarding wrongs
committed by corporate officers, the analogy to carrying informa-
tion to estate beneficiaries seems natural."99  If the attorney
becomes aware of injurious wrongdoing on the part of the personal
representative, the attorney may also bring the matter to the
attention of a supervising courtt °°
While Professor Pennell's analysis is compelling, several
problems are immediately apparent. First, not all states have
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 1 This is
potentially problematic, as Professor Pennell's argument hinges
upon Rule 1.13, which has no counterpart in the Disciplinary Rules.
As mentioned previously, Rule 1.13 concerns an attorney's
representation of an organization, and consequently, its constitu-
ents. Thus, states that have not adopted the Model Rules'
interpretation of an organization's representation may have
difficulty coming to the same conclusions as Professor Pennell due
to an inability to reconcile the differences between the Rules and
the Code.
Second, Professor Pennell's comparison of the estate to a
corporation, and his reliance upon established corporate law as a
guide, is troublesome. Unlike corporate executive officers, personal
representatives do not stand at the helm of the estate. In addition,
in contrast to a corporate executive officer, personal representatives
may not seek to perpetuate the existence of the estate, or generate
income for the benefit of its constituents. They may only act in the
interests of the beneficiaries when those interests parallel the intent
not rectify the wrongdoing, and leaves the attorney in a difficult situation when withdrawal
is required. Pennell thus views the entity approach as a solution to these problems. Id. at
1339.
99. Id. at 1337.
100. Id. at 1337; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.13, and
comments.
101. Some 37 jurisdictions have adopted the Model Rules. ABA/BNA LAWYER'S
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 01:3 (1994). Furthermore, disciplinary rules are
not binding as law upon the courts. See, e.g., In re Kutner, 399 N.E.2d 963 (I11. 1979); In re
Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39 (Ohio 1909).
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of the testator. Furthermore, beneficiaries and fiduciaries do not
share the same relationship with one another, or with an attorney,
as do corporate constituents. For instance, a shareholder's interests
may, in fact, conflict with those of a corporation or a board of
directors. However, with respect to estate administration, a
beneficiary's interests may not conflict with the estate's.
10 2
Furthermore, whereas disgruntled shareholders may oust corporate
officers, disgruntled beneficiaries may not vote personal representa-
tives out of their respective positions.1 3 These significant and
irreconcilable differences that exist between corporations and
estates undermine the validity of Professor Pennell's comparison to
the corporate organization.
Finally, and most importantly, recognition of the estate as the
client is wholly inconsistent with property law, and not entirely
consistent with tax law. Property law emphasizes that the estate is
a mere compilation of assets and liabilities owned by the decedent
prior to distribution by will or intestacy." It is merely a conduit
created for the sole purpose of passing a decedent's property to his
beneficiaries.0 5  The personal representative, appointed to
administer the estate, has no interest in the estate itself."° The
personal representative's sole purpose is to gather the decedent's
assets and distribute them as quickly and efficiently as possible.
Hence, it is difficult to equate an estate with a client or organiza-
tion.
The estate's status as an organization fares little better under
tax law. While the estate is taxed as a separate entity, the purpose
102. As will be seen throughout this Article, it is a continuing theme, shared by both
courts and commentators, that there is a potential for adversity between the beneficiaries and
the personal representative. This makes little sense from an analytical standpoint. The
relationship between the beneficiaries and the fiduciaries is analogous to the relationship
between the decedent and the beneficiaries in this regard. The personal representative
stands in the shoes of the decedent only inasmuch as an individual is required to carry out
the decedent's intent. No matter how much power personal representatives wield in their
ability to handle the assets, personal representatives are powerless to change the assets'
ultimate destination. The very nature of the personal representative's existence is to carry
out the intent of the decedent. Once this is accomplished, it becomes apparent that there
is no more adversity between the beneficiaries and the personal representative or the estate,
than if it were the testator himself administering the estate.
103. A personal representative may be removed, however, by petition to the court. See
U.P.C. § 3-611(a) (1983).
104. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 379; see also Hansen v. Stanton, 31
P.2d 903 (Wash. 1934).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
106. See Eger v. Eger, 314 N.E.2d 394 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974).
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of United States tax law is to allow the federal government to
collect its taxes, either income or estate, before the decedent's
property passes into the hands of the beneficiaries."°7 Therefore,
it is apparent that an estate is not an "organization" within the
meaning of Rule 1.13, or any other body of law designed to deal
with an entity. Rather, the estate is a legal fiction created for a
limited and specific purpose. Any attempt to treat the estate as a
client gives insufficient weight to the origins, disposition, and
purpose of the estate. It must not be forgotten that the creation of
this conduit is a direct result of the decedent's intent, and nothing
more.
B. Foreseeability Under a Negligence Approach
Another approach, lauded primarily by commentators, suggests
that an attorney owes a duty of reasonable care to third parties.
This approach is based upon the premise that one who chooses to
act must assume liability for those actions. 08 Here, the initial
threshold of duty does not pivot on the existence or nonexistence
of privity. Rather, establishment of a duty requires a multi-step
process. First, the plaintiff must show the "existence of an
undertaking" on the part of the attorney.' Once an "undertak-
ing" is shown to exist, the analysis proceeds to determining
"foreseeability."' ' 0 This, in turn, requires a three part inquiry: (1)
the plaintiff must be foreseeable; (2) the plaintiff's reliance upon
the attorney must be foreseeable; and (3) the resulting harm must
have been foreseeable.' Thus, to prove the requisite duty of
care, third parties must show that the "undertaking" was one that
foreseeably affected their interests. 12  Accordingly, "when
professionals undertake tasks for their clients, their expertise and
knowledge can induce reliance in parties with whom they are not
in privity.
''1 3
107. 26 U.S.C. § 641 (1988); Mott v. United States, 462 F.2d 512 (Ct. CI. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973).
108. Eisenberg, supra note 79, at 127.
109. Id. at 145; see also Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922) (One who assumes
to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully,
if he acts at all.).
110. Eisenberg, supra note 79, at 152.
111. Id. at 152-56.
112. This conforms to the principle set forth by Judge Cardozo in Glanzer, 135 N.E. at
277: "[D]iligence was owing, not only to him who ordered, but to him also who relied."
113. Eisenberg, supra note 79, at 152.
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"Foreseeability" depends on the identification of the beneficia-
ries as potential plaintiffs and the likelihood that they will rely on
the attorney's action." 4 In the case of an attorney representing
a personal representative, this requirement is easily fulfilled since
the attorney knows that her work has a direct effect not only on
the personal representatives, but on the beneficiaries as third
parties.
Two primary policies underpin this approach. First, liability
through an assumed duty satisfies such social policies as compensat-
ing innocent victims and preventing lack of care in attorney actions.
Second, economic policies of efficiency and risk allocation are
promoted.1 5  Proponents argue that attorneys should bear the
cost of injury because they have the benefit of greater expertise
and easier access to information. 6 Attorneys, as professionals,
are deemed to possess knowledge and expertise "above the level of
the marketplace." ' Therefore, they should be held to a higher
standard of care, as are other professionals. 8
The primary disadvantage of this approach is the fear that its
application will result in potential liability to an overbroad class of
harmed individuals. This fear was enunciated over a century ago
in Winterbottom v. Wright,"9 in which an English mailcoach
driver sued the manufacturer of a defective coach. The manufac-
turer owed a duty to the driver's employer to build and maintain
the coaches it supplied. The driver alleged that he had been
injured by latent defects in the coach. Noting the absence of
privity between the driver and the manufacturer, the court refused
114. Id. at 155.
115. The justification for risk allocation is that attorneys are better able to insulate
themselves from heavy losses than are innocent third parties due to attorneys' ability to
procure insurance, and because attorneys' skill and knowledge puts them in a better position
to assess risks.
116. Eisenberg, supra note 79, at 128.
117. Security Sav. Bank v. Kellems, 9 S.W.2d 967, 970 (Mo. 1928); see also Bailey v.
Tucker, 621 A.2d 108 (Pa. 1993) (attorney who agrees to representation impliedly agrees to
provide a level of services consistent with those of the profession at large); Walker v. Bangs,
601 P.2d 1279 (Wash. 1979).
118. The comparison being made is to medical doctors, who are held to a higher standard
of care than "persons on the street." A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action usually must
establish the standard of care through expert testimony. The plaintiff must then prove that,
in light of these standards, the doctor was unskillful or negligent. See, e.g., Walski v.
Tiesenga, 381 N.E.2d 279 (11. 1978); see also Wall v. Stout, 311 S.E.2d 571 (N.C. 1984)
(specialists are held to standard of their specialties, not to standards of profession as a
whole).
119. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
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to recognize a duty running from the manufacturer to the driver.
Specifically, the court stated:
If we were to hold that [a third party] could sue in such a
case, there is no point at which such actions would stop. The
only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who
enter into the contract: if we go one step beyond that, there is
no reason why we should not go fifty. The only real argument
in favor of the action is, that this is a case of hardship; but that
might have been obviated, if the plaintiff had made himself a
party to the contract.12
While this rule has been obliterated in its applicability to product
liability cases, the principles remain relevant and applicable to
attorney-client situations. Without established boundaries, an
attorney's ability to gauge the nature and extent of his obligations,
and the potential risk of liability, is severely hampered.121 To
hold an attorney liable to such a potentially large class hampers the
attorney's ability to represent his client, and the legal system
invariably suffers as a result.
C. Third Party Beneficiary Approach
The third party beneficiary doctrine is derived from contract
law. Generally, a third party may sue on a contract, despite a lack
of privity, when two parties enter into an agreement with an intent
to confer a direct benefit upon the third party.22 The leading
case from which this doctrine is derived is Lawrence v. Fox."2
Decided by the New York Court of Appeals, Lawrence
presents the classic third party beneficiary situation. In Lawrence,
the promisee lent the promisor $300 on the condition that the
promisor pay the same amount to a named third party the next
day. Had the promisor performed, the promisee would have been
free of a debt he owed the third party, and the promissor would
have been free of the debt he owed the promissee. When the
promisor failed to perform, the court sustained a suit by the third
party against him, despite the lack of privity.124 The decision was
based upon notions of equity and fairness; the promisee owed a
120. Id.
121. MALLEN, supra note 11, at 361.
122. Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618 (Md. 1985).
123. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
124. Id. at 279.
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duty to the third party, and the promissor agreed to take on that
duty, but failed to do so. Thus, the third party, who is owed the
duty, is the appropriate party to bring suit.12
In a legal malpractice context, this approach recognizes that an
attorney, as promisor, and a client, as promisee, have the power to
create rights in an estate beneficiary.126 Thus, the attorney owes
a duty to a beneficiary when circumstances indicate that the agree-
ment was made for the beneficiary's benefit. 27 The estate
beneficiary is considered an "intended" beneficiary of the prom-
ise. 28
Although the third party beneficiary approach primarily grants
reprieve to third parties in non-adversarial situations,129 tradition-
al barriers remain strong in instances where adversarial situations
may arise."3  The rationale for these barriers is stated by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Pelham v. Griesheimer31  Pelham
involved an action by children of a client against an attorney who
had procured a divorce and a property settlement for the client.
The court held that the claimants were, at best, incidental benefi-
ciaries of the employment. 32  Specifically, the court stated: "In
the area of legal malpractice, the attorney's obligations to his client
must remain paramount." '33  The Pelham court noted the pre-
dominantly adversarial nature of divorce proceedings, and invoked
the traditional privity requirement against the children. Envisaging
the various interests of mother and child that might collide upon
125. Id.
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS n.2, 438 (1981).
127. MALLEN, supra note 11, at 385.
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(l)(b). Intent is the critical
factor in applying the third party beneficiary approach.
129. For example, beneficiaries of a poorly drafted will are protected from the negligence
of the drafting attorney. See, e.g., Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983). The
rationale is that there is an underlying contract between a testator and an attorney for the
drafting of a will. The will serves as a manifestation of the intent of the parties to benefit
the named legatees through performance of the contract. See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d
685 (Cal. 1961); Copenhaver v. Rogers, 384 S.E.2d 593 (Va. 1989). This theory is not limited
to contract. Actions in negligence also may be brought against an attorney under a third
party beneficiary approach. See Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Or. 1987) ("[U]nder [a]
third-party analysis the contract creates a 'duty' not only to the promisee, the client, but also
to the intended beneficiary, [therefore] negligent nonperformance may give rise to a
negligence action as well.").
130. See MALLEN, supra note 11.





divorce, the court found: "We refuse to create such a wide range
of potential conflicts by imposing such duties upon an attorney in
favor of a non-client, unless the intent to benefit the third party is
clearly evident." '134
Applying the Pelham rule, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected
the notion of a duty owed by an attorney to an estate beneficiary.
In Neal v. Baker,135 a named beneficiary of a testator's estate filed
a complaint against the attorney hired by a personal representative
to assist in administering the estate, alleging that the attorney's
negligence caused her monetary damage.3 6  The trial court
dismissed the plaintiff's complaint,137 holding that to support a
legal malpractice claim, the plaintiff must show that the attorney-
client contract was entered into with a specific intent to directly
benefit the plaintiff as a third party beneficiary.138
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court stated that an attorney
owes a duty to a non-client only in the most limited circumstanc-
es.139 Essentially, the attorney owes a duty only to "intended
beneficiaries" of a relationship between a client and the attor-
ney."4 Reiterating the concerns of the court in Pelham, the Neal
court noted that an estate beneficiary often becomes "the opposing
party in an adversarial forum." '141 The beneficiary, therefore,
must offer a clear indication that the attorney's representation is
intended directly to confer a benefit upon her.'42 The court
declined to hold that a clear indication existed here:
[I]t is clear that [the plaintiff] was not a direct third-party
beneficiary. The primary purpose of the attorney-client
relationship between [the personal representative] and defen-
dant was to assist [the personal representative] in the proper
administration of its duties. It is obvious that defendant could
not have been hired with the intent to directly benefit [plaintiff]
when the adversarial nature of the relationship between
[plaintiff] and the attorney becomes evident.
134. Id.
135. 551 N.E.2d 704 (I11. App.), appeal denied, 555 N.E.2d 378 (II1. 1990).




140. Neal, 551 N.E.2d at 705.




Plaintiff's mere assertion that the attorney was hired with
the intent to directly benefit plaintiff is not sufficient to state a
cause of action. The intent plaintiff referred to in her com-
plaint was nothing more than the general intent implicit in an
executor hiring an attorney to assist in administering the estate.
We hold no duty extends to a beneficiary under these circum-
stances.143
The primary rationale for refusing to recognize estate beneficiaries
as "intended beneficiaries" is the relationship between the
beneficiary and the personal representative. The potential for
adversity leaves them as "incidental" beneficiaries to the agreement
between the personal representative and the attorney."
Recognizing a duty only to "intended beneficiaries" has several
advantages. The beneficiaries named by a testator are able to
enforce their rights and receive their intended benefits, which
certainly is consistent with notions of justice and equity. The
courts' refusal to recognize such a duty seems contrary to common
sense and the nature of the attorney's purpose. Furthermore,
recognizing a duty running from the attorney to the beneficiaries
is fairly restrictive in establishing the class of individuals to whom
the attorney is liable. As a result, the fears set forth in Winter-
143. Id.
144. Id.; see also Rutkoski v. Hollis, 600 N.E.2d 1284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). Even if the
plaintiff properly alleged that an estate beneficiary is an "intended" beneficiary of the
relationship between a personal representative and an attorney, the action could not be
brought successfully because of the potentially adversarial relationship between the personal
representative's interests and the interests of the beneficiaries.
The rationale of the Illinois courts, and all other courts that apply the third party
beneficiary analysis, is inherently flawed. An attorney hired by a personal representative
does not represent the personal representative in the representative's personal capacity,
rather she represents the office. The entire purpose of estate administration is the
dissolution of the estate and distribution of the assets to the intended beneficiaries. To carry
out this purpose, the law recognizes a legal fiction in either the estate administrator or
personal representative. Estate administration is geared toward carrying out the intent of
the testator to benefit the legal heirs or beneficiaries. The existence of duties to the
beneficiaries inure to the very nature of the relationships involved. Therefore, it seems
absurd to say that those whom the entity is created to benefit are considered "incidental."
The relationship between an attorney and the beneficiaries during estate administration is
analogous to the relationship between a drafting attorney and the beneficiaries under a will
before the testator dies. There, as here, the beneficiaries are named by the testator. In the
first situation, the testator lives; in the second, he is dead, and the personal representative
stands in his shoes. The essence of the personal representative's duty is to carry out the
intentions of the testator, and thereby to benefit the named beneficiaries. Thus, it becomes
apparent that no more potential for adversity between the beneficiaries and the personal
representative exists than if the testator were to administer the estate himself.
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bottom v. Wright" are not likely to be realized because the
attorney does not owe a universal duty. Rather, she owes a duty
only to individuals contemplated by the parties entering into the
agreement.1
However, the primary concern of courts that adopt this
approach seems to center around the potential adversarial relation-
ship between the personal representative and the beneficiaries.
Courts fear that recognizing a duty to both the personal representa-
tive and the beneficiaries creates an untenable conflict of interest
for attorneys and hampers their ability to represent their clients,
the personal representatives, adequately. Presumably, the fear is
that attorneys' ethical obligations to clients are undermined if they
are held to owe a duty to non-client beneficiaries. The prevailing
view is that a conflict of interest arises whenever the interest of the
personal representative is not entirely consistent with the interest
of a beneficiary. Thus, as a policy matter, courts applying a third
party beneficiary approach refuse to recognize a duty owed by
attorneys to estate beneficiaries. 47
Regardless of whether one agrees with this analysis, no court
to date has used an intended beneficiary analysis to recognize a
duty owed to estate beneficiaries by an attorney hired to assist in
estate administration. Courts applying a third party beneficiary
approach have held invariably that an estate beneficiary is
"incidental" rather than "intended," and therefore, have declined
to recognize a duty on the part of the attorney.'"
D. Multi-Factor Balancing - Another Negligence Approach
Based on general negligence principles, the multi-factor
balancing approach was the first to depart from the historical
requirement of privity as a foundation for third party liability. The
145. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
146. It should be noted, however, that a third party beneficiary approach is not entirely
restrictive; the intentions of the parties in making the contract remains a question of fact, and
thus, is subject to erosion with time and changing social attitude.
147. See, e.g., Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d 1080 (Wash. 1994); Neal v. Baker, 551 N.E.2d 704
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
148. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Akins, 637 A.2d 424, 428 (D.C. App. Ct. 1993) ("Whether a
beneficiary of an estate may sue the attorney of the personal representative for negligence
is an issue this court has not had occasion to decide. We now join the broad majority of the
courts considering the question and hold ... that no such duty exists.").
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balancing approach first was applied by the California Supreme
Court in Biakanja v. Irving.149
Biakanja involved a notary public who illegally and negligently
prepared a will for a client. The will was held invalid because the
notary failed to have it properly attested in accordance with
California law,"S and as a result, the decedent's estate was
distributed in accordance with California intestacy law."' The
decedent's sister sued the notary to recover the difference between
what she would have received under the will, had it been valid, and
the amount actually distributed to her.152 The California Su-
preme Court, sitting en banc, held that the notary was under a duty
to exercise due care to protect the plaintiff from injury."5 3
Further, the notary was liable for damages caused to the plaintiff
by his negligence, even though they were not in privity of con-
tract. 154
The Biakanja court determined that a duty to third parties
could be imposed, as a matter of policy, by balancing the following
six factors:
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff;
(2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;
(3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury;
(4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injuries suffered;
(5) the policy of preventing future harm; and
(6) whether recognition of liability under the circumstances
would impose an undue burden on the profession. 5
149. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).




154. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19.
155. Id. at 19. Note that the Biakanja court actually used "the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct" as one of its balancing factors. This factor was later dropped by
the California Supreme Court in Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), and replaced with
the current factor, "whether recognition of liability under the circumstances would impose
an undue burden on the profession." See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text; see also
Goldberg v. Frye, 266 Cal. Rptr. 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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Since the balancing test was applied first by the Biakanja court,
other jurisdictions have adopted it and applied this test in numer-
ous situations.156
Three years after the Biakanja decision, the California
Supreme Court applied the balancing approach to a case involving
an attorney who had negligently drafted a will. In Lucas v.
Hamm,157 an attorney agreed to prepare a will for his client,
which named the plaintiffs as beneficiaries. The attorney negligent-
ly inserted language that violated California law relating to
restraints on alienation and the rule against perpetuities. 58 As a
result, the plaintiffs received a lesser amount than they would have
had the pertinent language been valid.
The beneficiaries sued the attorney for damages arising from
his negligence. '59 Although the court refused to hold the attorney
liable,"6 the court confirmed the applicability of the balancing
approach and recognized the existence of a duty owed to the
beneficiaries by the attorney.1 61  In particular, the court noted
that the recognition of a duty in this context does not impose an
undue burden on the legal profession. This finding is further
supported "when we consider that a contrary conclusion would
result in the innocent beneficiary bearing the loss." 62
The Biakanja and Lucas decisions have made significant
inroads in legal malpractice situations. Courts applying the
balancing approach, however, have not recognized a duty owed by
156. See, e.g., Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967) (architects); Title Ins. Co.
of Minn. v. Construction Escrow Serv., 675 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. App. Ct. 1984) (escrow agents);
Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Col, 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. Ct. 1973)
(accountants); cf. Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
157. 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961).
158. Lucas, 364 P.2d at 686.
159. Id.
160. The court acknowledged that the questions before it have long perplexed courts,
practitioners, and commentators. Therefore, it would be improper to hold the defendant
liable for failing to adhere to a standard higher than one of ordinary skill and capacity. Id.
at 689-90 ("The attorney is not liable for every mistake he may make in his practice; he is
not .. . an insurer of the soundness of his opinions or of the validity of an instrument that
he is engaged to draft; and he is not liable for being in error as to a question of law on which
reasonable doubt may be entertained by well informed lawyers.").
161. Id. at 688-89 ("Since defendant was authorized to practice [law], we must consider
an additional factor not present in Biakanja, namely, whether the recognition of liability to
beneficiaries of wills negligently drawn by attorneys would impose an undue burden on the
profession.").
162. Id. at 688.
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an attorney to estate beneficiaries when hired by a personal
representative." In Goldberg v. Frye,"6 the California Court
of Appeals directly confronted this issue. The Goldberg case
evolved from a complicated set of facts involving a divorce
agreement between the decedent and his ex-wife.65 The dece-
dent subsequently made several intervivos gifts to a charitable trust
in violation of that agreement.' 66 The personal representative
then arranged a settlement to a suit filed by the ex-wife against the
estate.' 67  The settlement payments significantly depleted the
assets of the estate, making it impossible to pay specific bequests
to the estate beneficiaries."
The beneficiaries filed a complaint against both the personal
representative and the attorney hired to assist in estate administra-
169tion. The complaint alleged that the attorney had acted impru-
dently when he negotiated the settlement agreement. 7 The
complaint further alleged that the attorney had failed to give
adequate notice to the beneficiaries of the effect the agreement
would have upon their expectancies.1 71 The court did not address
the issue of negligence on the part of the attorney; it simply refused
to recognize a duty.72
The Goldberg court only briefly addressed the Lucas and
Biakanja decisions. Instead, the court chose to rely upon a reitera-
tion of the balancing test in a leading treatise on legal malprac-
163. Applying a combined third party beneficiary balancing approach, the Washington
Supreme Court held that a duty is not owed from an attorney hired by the personal
representative to the estate or to the estate beneficiaries because (1) the estate and its
beneficiaries are incidental, not intended, beneficiaries of the attorney-personal representa-
tive relationship, (2) the estate heirs may bring a direct cause of action against the personal
representative for breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) the unresolvable conflict of interest an
estate attorney encounters in deciding whether to represent the personal representative, the
estate, or the estate heirs unduly burdens the legal profession. Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d 1080
(Wash. 1994); see also Hopkins v. Akins, 637 A.2d 424 (D.C. App. Ct. 1993). The principal
reason for the rule that an attorney hired by an executor owes no duty to the beneficiaries
of the estate is the potentially adversarial relationship that exists between an executor's
interest in administering the estate and the interests of the beneficiaries of the estate.
164. 266 Cal. Rptr. 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
165. Id. at 484-85.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 485.
168. Id.
169. Goldberg, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 489-90.
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tice.1 However, the court's analysis echoed a third party
beneficiary approach rather than a balancing test. 74 Specifically,
the court stated that the predominant inquiry is whether the
principal purpose of the attorney's retention is to provide legal
services for the benefit of the plaintiff.75 Viewing the legatees'
claim in this light, the court found it "impossible to conclude that
the parties to the attorney's contract... entered into same for the
principal purpose of providing benefit to the legatees." '76
As with any of foregoing approaches, the balancing approach
has certain benefits. First, applying a balancing test advances the
policy goals of providing remedies to innocent victims of negligent
attorneys, forcing these attorneys to bear the cost of their negli-
gence and deterring legal malpractice in general. Second, the
multi-factor balancing test is fairly well established and has been
applied in a number of other situations." This is particularly
useful, as it is easily referenced and familiar to both courts and
practitioners.
However, the balancing approach has several apparent
disadvantages as well. First, although this approach has been used
in many jurisdictions and in a number of situations, it is not always
easy to apply.178 The difficulty in applying the balancing ap-
proach may explain why California courts have effectively reduced
the approach to a single third party beneficiary factor in difficult
situations.1 79  In addition, no court has applied this approach to
the attorney-personal representative-beneficiary relationship in a
173. Id. at 489 (citing MALLEN, supra note 11).
174. California courts, despite having authored the multi-factor balancing test, seem
reluctant to apply it in the way it was applied by the Biakanja court. For instance, in
Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1976), purchasers of corporate stock brought a
legal malpractice claim against the attorney for the corporate officers. The plaintiffs alleged
that the attorney had incorrectly advised the officers as to the sale of the stock resulting in
violations of Federal Stock Registration requirements. The supreme court rejected the
malpractice claim, emphasizing that the agreement between the attorney and the officers was
in no way intended to benefit the plaintiffs as purchasers of stock. Id. at 743.
175. Goldberg, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
176. Id. The court rested its decision primarily upon the "well established" body of law
that recognizes the personal representative as the client, not the estate or beneficiaries: "By
assuming a duty to the [personal representative], an attorney undertakes to perform services
which may benefit [beneficiaries] of the estate, but he has no contractual privity with
[them]." Id. at 488.
177. See generally MALLEN, supra note 11, at 383-84.
178. See Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp 1335 (N.D.Cal. 1991) (the test
is too unreliable for close cases).
179. See Goldberg, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 483; Goodman, 556 P.2d at 742 (citations omitted).
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manner favorable to the beneficiary. In fact, every court applying
a balancing test to this issue has refused to recognize any duty
owed by an attorney to a beneficiary. Once again, the primary
rationale focuses on the adversarial relationship between the estate
beneficiaries and the personal representative. Finally, application
of the balancing test does not place any concrete restrictions on the
courts applying it. Once again, the attorney's ability to predict who
will be adversely affected by her actions is seriously impaired.
Thus, as one commentator put it: "[Tlhe balancing of factors test
substitutes ad hoc determinations for principled and predictable
analysis.""'
E. Pass Through Privity Approach
The final approach, pass through privity, results in attorney
liability to estate beneficiaries through the attorney's relationship
with the personal representative who hired her. Thus, under this
approach, the attorney owes a duty to the beneficiary vis-a-vis the
attorney's duty to the personal representative and the personal
representative's duty to the beneficiary: hence the term "pass
through privity."
This approach has been applied by Ohio courts to a number
of legal malpractice situations.'81 For example, in Elam v. Hyatt
Legal Services,"s the Ohio Supreme Court directly addressed the
duty owed by an attorney hired by a personal representative to the
beneficiaries of an estate. In Elam, the decedent left her husband
a life estate in a piece of real property,"8' and also named him
personal representative to her estate184 As personal representa-
tive, he hired the defendant attorney to assist in administering the
estate. 185 During the course of administration, the attorney
recorded a certificate of transfer, which transferred the devised real
180. Timothy L. Hall, Legal Malpractice in Mississippi: Suits by Non-Clients, 64 MISS. L.J.
1, 20 (1994); see also Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983) (rejecting the balancing test
on the grounds that it "has proved unworkable and led to ad hoc determinations and
inconsistent results").
181. See, e.g., Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 628 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio 1994) (attorneys hired
by general partners owe duty to limited partners); Elam v. Hyatt Legal Serv., 541 N.E.2d 616
(Ohio 1989) (attorney hired by personal representative owes duty to estate beneficiaries).
182. 541 N.E.2d 616 (Ohio 1989).
183. Id.




estate to the husband in fee simple. 86 The remaindermen settled
with the executor, and subsequently sued the defendant's law firm
for damages arising from negligence in handling the estate."8
Both the trial court and the appellate court held that the attorney
owed no duty to the named beneficiaries, since the attorney
represented the personal representative.1
88
The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed and held that the attorney
owed a duty to the estate beneficiaries. The court based its
decision on two fundamental concepts. First, the court found that
the personal representative owes an affirmative duty to the estate
beneficiaries: "It is the duty of the fiduciary of an estate to serve
... the entire estate. . . . [He therefore] owes a duty to [the]
beneficiaries to act in a manner which protects [their] inter-
ests., 189  Second, the court concluded that the attorney and the
personal representative are in direct privity with one another: "In
probate, the attorney-client relationship exists between the attorney
and the [personal representative]."''" Specifically, the court
found: "A beneficiary whose interest in an estate is vested is in
privity with the fiduciary of the estate, and where such privity exists
the attorney for the fiduciary is not immune from liability to the
vested beneficiary for damages arising from the attorney's negligent
performance."1 91
The Elam court's decision certainly is not in concurrence with
the vast majority of courts that have addressed this issue.' 92
However, this decision has established in Ohio that an attorney
186. Id.
187. Elam, 541 N.E.2d at 616.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 618; see also supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
190. Elam, 541 N.E.2d at 616.
191. Id. at 618.
192. See, e.g., Steinway v. Bolden, 460 N.W.2d 306 (Mich. App. Ct. 1990); Neal v. Baker,
551 N.E.2d 704 (IIl. App. Ct. 1992); Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d 1080 (Wash. 1994); Hopkins
v. Akins, 637 A.2d 424 (D.C. App. 1993); Goldberg v. Frye, 266 Cal. Rptr. 483 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990). The Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the American
Bar Association also rejects this view. In a formal opinion released May 9, 1994, the
Committee stated: "The fact that the personal representative client has obligations toward
the beneficiaries does not impose parallel obligations on the lawyer ... A lawyer's duty of
confidentiality to a client is not lessened by the fact that the client is a personal representa-
tive. Although the Model Rules prohibit a lawyer from participating in a criminal or
fraudulent activity or active concealment of a client's wrongdoing, they do not authorize a
lawyer to breach confidence to prevent such wrongdoing." ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 (1994).
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retained by a personal representative owes a duty to those with
whom the client has a fiduciary relationship.
The Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Elam in
Arpadi v. First MSP Corp.93 This case addressed the issue of
whether an attorney hired by a general partner owes a duty to the
limited partners.' 94 The court rejected the attorney's argument
that recognition of such a duty creates an ethical dilemma.' 95
Furthermore, the court held that the attorney misperceived the
nature of the partnership relationship. 96 Ohio law adheres to the
principle that a partnership is an aggregate of individuals and does
not constitute a separate legal entity.'97 However, the court held
that an attorney owes a duty to a third party when a third party is
in privity with the individual or entity responsible for the attorney's
retention. 98 The court stated: "A fortiori those persons to whom
a fiduciary duty is owed are in privity with the fiduciary such that
an attorney-client relationship established with the fiduciary
extends to those in privity therewith regarding matters to which the
fiduciary duty relates."' 99  As a result, the court held that the
duty arising from the attorney-client relationship extended to the
limited partnership, since "the fiduciary relationship between the
general partner and the limited partners provides the requisite
element of privity recognized under Elam ....
The essence of the pass through privity approach is that the
duty arising from the attorney-client relationship between the
attorney and the personal representative is viewed as extending in
full to the beneficiaries of the estate. The relationship shared by
the personal representative and the beneficiaries provides the
193. 628 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio 1994).
194. Id. at 1338.
195. Id.
196. Id. Defendants supported their argument by citing the Code of Professional
Responsibility for the proposition that no duty is owed to limited partners by an attorney
representing the partnership. See EC 5-18 ("A lawyer employed or retained by a corpora-
tion or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director,
officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the entity. In advising the
entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its interests and his professional judgment should not
be influenced by thee personal desires of any person or organization.").
197. Arpadi, 628 N.E.2d at 1338; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1775.05(A) (1994);
Byers v. Schlupe, 38 N.E. 117 (Ohio 1894).
198. Arpadi, 628 N.E.2d at 1338.




requisite element of privity to establish a duty running from the
attorney to the beneficiaries. 1
Pass through privity has several advantages. First, the concept
fully recognizes the nature of the estate and does not impinge upon
either property or tax law. Recognizing a duty running from the
attorney to the beneficiaries through the personal representative
gives full accord to the conduit principle adopted by both bodies of
law.2 Second, pass through privity acknowledges the scope of a
fiduciary relationship and an attorney's proper role without
painting it too broadly. The approach recognizes a duty owed to
a third party only in very specific situations. The attorney owes a
duty only to those who share a fiduciary relationship with the
hiring client. Thus, all of the individuals to whom the attorney
might potentially be liable are immediately identifiable as individu-
als to whom the personal representative owes a duty, thereby
providing the attorney with a degree of certainty in performing her
duties. Third, the duty owed by the attorney to the beneficiaries
is clear. The personal representative's duty to the estate beneficia-
ries becomes the duty of the attorney, given the nature of the
personal representative's existence.
Pass through privity thus alleviates, rather than exacerbates,
potential adversity between the personal representative and the
beneficiaries. The attorney is required to disclose fully, and to all
parties concerned, the effects of the testamentary devise and local
law. In addition, the attorney is able to provide advice to benefi-
ciaries and the personal representative regarding proper allocation
of receipts or disbursements of income or principal. Relevant tax
issues also may be freely discussed among the parties.0 3 While
it seems odd not to include the beneficiaries in discussions that
impact them so significantly, recognition of the personal representa-
tive as a client in the traditional sense has just that effect.
The most significant problem facing the pass through privity
approach stems from the ethical implications of recognizing a duty
to any third party. These duties are set forth in a variety of
contexts, including the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
201. Id. at 1339.
202. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
203. For example, the parties may discuss the possibility and applicability of disclaimers,
QTIP elections, full utilization of the marital deduction, allocation of the GST exemption,
timing of retirement plan distributions and the income tax ramifications of such, or use of
administration expenses as estate tax or income tax deductions.
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However, the Model Rules do not deal with an attorney's conduct
when the attorney is involved in estate administration. The only
specific reference to estate administration is located in the official
comment to Rule 1.7, which addresses conflict of interest: "In
estate administration, the identity of the client may be unclear
under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the
client is the personal representative; under another view the client
is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries."2' This is far
from dispositive as to the responsibility of the attorney to the estate
beneficiaries. The failure of the Model Rules to address this
situation is not surprising, as their focus is primarily upon the
attorney's role as representative rather than counselor.' Argu-
ments concerning ethical considerations between estate beneficia-
ries and attorneys hired to assist in estate administration based
upon the Model Rules, thus, are ill founded. Admittedly, there are
situations when the personal representative and the beneficiaries
may not agree. This does not mean, however, that potential
adversity exists which should block a duty owed to beneficiaries by
the attorney. Adherence to any approach that refuses to recognize
a duty for these reasons may be convenient for practitioners, but
flies in the face of the very nature of estate administration.
The legal profession is not one that can rely on convenience to
form its rules and codes of conduct. A balancing must occur. Are
we more concerned with the attorney's relationship with her client,
or the interests of third parties who played no role in the agree-
ment between the attorney and the personal representative? Pass
through privity recognizes that the attorney's relationship with the
personal representative does not exist in a vacuum, separate and
distinct from the personal representative's relationship with the
beneficiaries.
VII. Conclusion
The issue of liability running from an attorney to beneficiaries
in estate administration is complex. However, once we recognize
the nature of the beast we are dealing with, it is easier to see what
is required to placate it. The goal of estate administration is to
carry out the intent of the decedent or the purpose of state
intestacy laws. In either case, that purpose is to gather and
204. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7, cmt. 13 (1995).
205. See id. Rules 2.1-2.3.
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distribute estate assets as quickly as possible. It seems only natural
that the duties owed by the personal representative to the benefi-
ciaries should be shared in full with the attorney hired to assist in
administering the estate. This result is realized most effectively by
taking a pass through privity approach.
Pass through privity, as a concept, does not rely on trouble-
some and unworkable analogies. It gives full recognition to the
nature and purpose of the estate without imposing an unreasonable
burden on the attorney. Pass through privity realizes the societal
need to afford adequate remedies to injured parties without holding
the attorney liable to an over-broad class of individuals. In fact, it
is limited to a very specific class of individuals: the estate benefi-
ciaries.
Recognition of a pass through privity concept substantially
clarifies an attorney's role in estate administration. A duty to fully
disclose all information pertaining to estate administration to the
estate beneficiaries is presumed. Perceived ethical problems are
alleviated, since the attorney is required to give full disclosure of
administrative matters to all parties involved. Full disclosure of all
information relating to estate administration also prevents situa-
tions that might be misperceived as adversarial.
In sum, attorneys should owe a duty of care to estate benefi-
ciaries. The imposition of this duty is in accord with societal
demands and public policy. Recognition of this duty, however,
must be consistent with established principles of property and tax
law. Pass through privity accomplishes these goals without being
overly broad in the class of individuals to whom the attorney will
be held liable.
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